The recent attacks over Indians in Australia is actually a surprise. One would usually expect such discrimination in Western Europe and in the US. But in a place where mostly things are silent and the only stir is the once invincible cricket team, it actually comes as a surprise. But it's not the first time that Australia (as a country) has had problems with ''non-whites''. The incident that I'm talking about goes back in time in 1919, when the Paris Peace Conference was held, after World War I, when the victors were having negotiations for their spoils.
It starts from a few years before that. In 1901, Japan raised strong objections to Australia's Immigration Restriction Act and lobbied the British extensively during the passage of Bill through Australian Federal parliament. Despite concern expressed in England, Royal Assent was given to the bill in late 1901. The White Australia Policy was in place.
During the next fifteen years Japan increased its strength and dominance in Asia. With this new power came the increasing likelihood that a challenge to the White Australia Policy would be made. Prime Minister, Billy Hughes believed that a showdown was approaching. This belief influenced his strategy during World War One, which was aimed at maximising Australia's influence in London. He knew he would need British support.
In 1919, after the chaos and tragedy of World War One, world leaders descended on Paris to create a new world order. The degree to which they did so has long been debated but one of their achievenments was the League of Nations.
Australia's contribution to the war effort had been substantial. The Prime Minister, Billy Hughes, saw this as reason enough to extract the best possible conditions for Australia in peace. He campaigned to give Australia separate representation at the Peace Conference. His request was granted. Soon after the beginning of the conference Billy Hughes was at the centre of a major crisis, involving himself, the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson and the Japanese delegation.
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And then we come to Mr. Hughes, the smallest but the most outspoken of all the delegates at the Peace Conference. If any doubted his wisdom at times none doubted his fearlessness. He will go down in history as the man who caused the first of many crises that have made the Peace Conference appear a misnomer." Vernon Bartlett, 'Behind the Scenes at the Peace Conference'. George Allen & Unwin, London, 1919. p 25
The Japanese wanted to insert a racial equality clause into the preamble of the Covenant for the League of Nations. They maintained that the introduction of the principle was only just, given their alliance with the British Empire in the war victory. However, Billy Hughes claimed it would be a threat to the sanctity of White Australia.
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At the Conference of Nations the Prime Minister was called upon to battle desperately for this [White Australia], compared to which our sacrifices in war, our achievements, our gains, fade into insignificance. For we would gladly sacrifice as much again-or give up all that we have gained-rather than forsake this policy."Percy E. Deane (Hughes' private secretary) 'Australia's Rights: The Fight at the Peace Table', Political Pamphlet, 1920
On February 4, 1919, two of the Japanese delegates, Baron Makino Nobuaki and Viscount Chinda Sutemi, approached one of the senior United States representatives, Colonel House, with their proposal. They wanted the following:
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The equality of the nations being a principle of the League, the Hight Contracting partiesagree that concerning the treatment and rights to be accorded to aliens in their territories they will not discriminate, either by law or in fact, against any person or persons on account of his or their race or nationality."
Colonel House wrote in his diary:"The Japs are making the adoption of a clause regarding immigration a sine qua non of their adhesion to the League of Nations. I have a feeling that it can be worked out by a satisfactory compromise which will in no way weaken the American or British Dominions' position and yet will satisfy the amour-propre of the Japanese."Fitzhardinge, Biography of Hughes, Volume 2, p 401
However, House's optimism was misplaced. Billy Hughes objected from the outset. His position was shared with others from the British Delegation. Former British Prime Minister and a member of the British entourage, Arthur James Balfour, told the Americans:
"…that the doctrine that all men are created equal was an eighteenth century idea, which he did not believe to be true. There might be some sense in which all people of one country were equal but he did not believe that a man in Central Africa was created equal to a European."Fitzhardinge. Volume 2, p 401-2
The Japanese submitted their clause to the League of Nations Commission on the 13 February. They spent the next few months lobbying delegates from the British Empire and the United States. They searched for a sympathetic ear. Hughes met with the Japanese twice, on March 14 and again on March 18. He did not meet them again. His mind was made up.
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Hughes alone persisted along his stubborn, solitary path. He was not sympathetic to the Japanese stand…The other Prime ministers were free to do as they liked, he would do what his duty demanded. So saying, he left the meeting." Japanese delegation to Foreign Minister. March 30, 1919. Fitzhardinge p 405
The Australian Prime Minister caused no end of trouble for the British and American delegations. Whilst Hughes' did bully and nag the two great leaders it was said they were quietly relieved at the Australian's vehement opposition to the bill. This was particularly the case for President Wilson. He was concerned that the statement proposed by the Japanese implied equality between white and black. This would not be well received in the United States Senate or on the West Coast of his nation.
The South African Prime Minister, General Jan Christiaan Smuts, was enlisted to try to mediate between the Japanese and the Australians. He advised the Japanese that it would be unwise to approach the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, to intervene.
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Hughes' position as a delegate at the Peace Conference was quite independent as regards to the United Kingdom, and that much being the case the United Kingdom Prime Minister was in no position to interfere; Hughes moreover was by nature very narrow- minded and was not the kind of man to consider international implications- he was also pig-headed; if there was any interference it might well serve to merely intensify his opposition."General Smuts in Fitzhardinge. Volume 2. p 405
Despite General Smuts' efforts he had little effect on convincing either of the parties to reach a compromise. Finally, he conceded, telling the Japanese on March 27:
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if Hughes maintained his opposition, as he undoubtedly would, he, Smuts, would have to fall in line and vote with the Dominions..."General Smuts in Fitzhardinge. Volume 2. p 405
Billy Hughes' stance was being galvanised by messages from home.
"…the executive of the National Federation place upon record its appreciation of the services rendered by Mr. W. M. Hughes, Prime Minister to Australia and to the cause of civilisation generally.. and ventures to say that posterity will gratefully acknowledge its indebtedness to the man who fought to keep Australia free and white…"The Argus, February 14, 1919
However, Hughes was not convinced that his efforts in Paris were enough to prevent the introduction of the racial equality clause. In a cable home he reported:"
We are being enmeshed in a web from which I find no way of freeing ourselves."Cables exchanges between Mr. Hughes and Mr. Watt, April 5, 1919. National Archives of Australia, CP360/8
On the April 11, in a meeting chaired by Woodrow Wilson, the Japanese delegation forced a vote. Elevenof the seventeen nations voted in favour of the racial equality provision. However, the vote was declared lost because it was not unanimous. Hughes had won. He returned to Australia triumphant.
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The White Australia is yours. You may do with it what you please, but at any rate, the soldiers have achieved the victory and my colleagues and I have brought that great principle back to you from the conference, as safe as it was on the day when it was first adopted." Hughes to parliament; reported in P.E. Deane. 'Australia's Rights: The Fight at the Peace Table'
Whilst Hughes saw the Paris Peace Conference as a great victory, his views, although popular in Australia, were not universaly supported. A warning was issued.
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Mr Hughes… has chosen to emphasise the national distinctions between the Japanese and ourselves in a way that could not fail to be offensive to a high spirited people … their effect in Japan has been most serious … improvement in our relations has been destroyed by a few sentences from Mr Hughes …" Major Piesse, March 24, 1919, Naval Office, Melbourne. MP, NAA 1049/1, 1918/049
This assessment came for Australia's director of military intelligence, Major E. L. Piesse. He recognised that Hughes' actions had deeply offended the Japanese and that Australia had been left dangerously exposed. He maintained that the White Australia Policy must be weakened but his advice was ignored.
So, is it a surprise that the same principle is still continuing today ......
